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Commentary: The logic of fossil fuel bans 
——Version accepted for publication in Nature Climate Change on 11 April 2018—— 
Fergus Green, London School of Economics and Political Science 
Houghton Street, London, WC2A 2AE 
R.F.Green@lse.ac.uk  
Until recently, national bans on fossil fuel-related activities were a taboo subject, but they 
are now becoming increasingly common. The logic of appropriateness that underpins 
such bans is key to understanding their normative appeal, and to explaining and 
predicting their proliferation. 
Almost every week, it seems, brings news of a new national commitment to ban or phase 
out fossil fuels. The Powering Past Coal Alliance, launched in November 2017, includes 
more than 25 nations that have pledged to phase out coal-fired power generation. France 
passed legislation in December 2017 banning new oil and gas exploration and extraction, 
and will phase-out existing production by 2040. In February 2018, the Irish Parliament took a 
first step toward similar legislation. Norway’s sovereign wealth fund has divested from coal 
stocks, while Ireland’s Parliament has voted to require its sovereign wealth fund to divest 
from all fossil fuel stocks. Hydraulic fracturing of natural gas has been banned in numerous 
countries (and hundreds of subnational jurisdictions).  
A fossil fuel ban is here defined as a constitutional, legislative or executive prohibition on the 
exploration, production, supply, transportation, intermediate processing, or consumption of 
a type of fossil fuel (coal, oil, or natural gas), the construction of infrastructure for any such 
purpose (for instance, oil pipelines, coal-fired power stations), or the financing of any such 
activity. This definition covers bans that prohibit only a subset of the relevant activity, such 
as new activities. For example, a state commitment to “prohibit the construction of new 
coalmines within its jurisdiction from 1 January 2019” would qualify as a fossil fuel ban 
based on this definition. 
What general features of fossil fuel bans might help us to understand their normative appeal 
and to explain their sudden emergence? Comparative analyses of the generic attributes of 
alternative climate policy instruments should help to answer this question. Yet fossil fuel 
bans have been neglected in this literature. The chapter on “National and Sub-national 
Policies and Institutions” in the IPCC’s Working Group III report, for example, contains not 
one mention of the word “ban”.1 This omission may be explained by the emphasis in such 
analyses on the evaluation of policies according to a consequentialist logic of efficiency, 
whereby the objective is to maximise net-benefits (the word “efficient” and its derivations 
appear 144 times in the above-mentioned IPCC chapter). A ban, any economist will tell you, 
is rarely a good way to maximise efficiency.  
But fossil fuel bans are better understood to be motivated by a “logic of appropriateness”: by 
a sense of what is right, natural, expected or legitimate for an agent with a given identity in a 
given situation, irrespective of cost–benefit calculation.2 Bans send a clear signal that 
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practices of large-scale fossil fuel exploitation are categorically wrong, and implicitly cast 
aspersions on the moral character of actors who engage in such practices.3 This logic 
resonates with the claims of electorally-significant, anti-fossil fuel social movements, and 
facilitates the diffusion of global moral norms proscribing the banned activities, both of 
which increase the likelihood of new bans being enacted.  
Political feasibility and the role of mobilisation 
A logic of appropriateness links fossil fuel bans with the motivations of mobilised, anti-fossil 
fuel activists.  
Historically, a major barrier to the enactment of climate policies such as carbon pricing has 
been the dearth of electorally-significant social movements that have arisen to champion 
them.4 While concern about climate change and general support for climate policies are 
widespread, this concern/support is typically shallow; relatively few people prioritise such 
policies, let alone take to the streets to demand them.4, 5 Such policies have instead been 
championed by professional environmental non-government organisations that are 
conversant in the logic of efficiency that dominates elite climate policy discourse.6 But these 
groups rarely have sufficient political power to achieve the institutionalisation of their 
policy preferences.6 
In part because of these challenges, environmental activists have shifted their focus in recent 
years to target fossil fuel projects and companies directly.4, 6 Such campaigns tap into the 
multiplicity of grievances typically associated with fossil fuel activities and companies, 
which can range from local health, environmental and land rights impacts to corporate-
government corruption, in addition to climate change itself.6, 7 Accordingly, campaigners 
have been able to frame their targets in terms of a logic of appropriateness, which has 
provided a resonant foundation for political mobilisation.7 Policy demands to ban fossil fuel 
activities are a logical expression of activism motivated by such a logic. The harmony of 
interests among actors opposed to one or more of these adverse impacts, meanwhile, 
facilitates the building of strong, electorally-significant alliances, which increase the 
likelihood of such policies being adopted.6, 7 
Many bans on hydraulic fracturing for natural gas, for example, can be attributed to the 
electoral incentives that these kinds of campaigns have influenced.6  
Conduciveness to policy diffusion and the role of norms 
The logic of appropriateness that underpins fossil fuel bans also facilitates their diffusion 
across jurisdictions. State fossil fuel bans signal to a global audience the wrongness of the 
banned activity. Accordingly, each new ban helps to redefine morally appropriate behaviour 
for states, and thus helps to build a global “anti-fossil fuel norm” proscribing the banned 
activity.7 As the number of states banning an activity rises, the social costs of non-conformity 
(for instance, a tarnished international reputation) increase,7 making it more likely, all else 
being equal, that other states will adopt a similar ban. 
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Of course, all else is not equal. Notably, unilateral fossil fuel bans carry a risk of 
production/consumption “leakage”, which incentivises other countries not to introduce an 
equivalent ban. But all unilateral climate policies entail an economic risk of leakage, which is 
why the potential of a policy to impose countervailing social costs on other states is so 
significant.8 This provides a reason to favour fossil fuel bans over climate policies that are 
based on a logic of efficiency, like carbon pricing: the latter are silent as to the inherent moral 
quality of fossil fuel activities,3 so their enactment in one jurisdiction is less able to shape 
conceptions of morally appropriate behaviour elsewhere; they risk leaking economic 
benefits to non-conforming states without imposing significant social costs on those states. 
Understanding the interactions between states’ social identities (affected by logics of 
appropriateness) and their incentives (the combination of social and economic costs and 
benefits) is crucial to explaining and predicting the diffusion of fossil fuel bans. Theory on 
anti-fossil fuel norms predicts that states identifying as “progressive” or “climate leaders” 
will be early adopters of fossil fuel bans that entail relatively low economic costs.7 Such bans 
reinforce those states’ identities while modelling appropriate behaviour for other states at 
little economic cost. This is a plausible explanation of France’s oil and gas supply ban and 
the UK’s plan to phase out coal-fired power generation by 2025. 
From transnational diffusion to international cooperation  
Early adopters of fossil fuel bans will rarely be content, however, to rely only on leadership 
by example. Rather, the imperatives to maximise global climate mitigation and minimise the 
risk of carbon “leakage” incentivise them to actively socialise other states to adopt similar 
bans, using tactics of persuasion and international institution-building.  
Fossil fuel bans have a structural feature that makes them an especially suitable subject of 
institutionalised international cooperation: transparency. The infrastructure necessary for 
fossil fuel projects is readily observable on the ground and via satellite. This makes it 
relatively easy for third parties (civil society actors and other states) to monitor and verify 
states’ compliance with their commitments to implement fossil fuel bans.9 Consequently, 
there is little need for champions of such bans to insist on internationally “legally binding” 
commitments, cumbersome monitoring, reporting and verification systems, or coercive 
enforcement mechanisms. Rather, they can socialise their peers by establishing non-binding, 
political forums with minimal institutional architecture at relatively low cost. 
Recent commitments to phase out coal-fired power generation provide an instructive 
example of this potential to institutionalise international cooperation on fossil fuel bans. The 
British and Canadian governments not only led by example with their own commitments to 
phase-out coal-fired power generation. They also established a new organisational platform, 
the Powering Past Coal Alliance, and launched it with much fanfare at COP23, to encourage 
participation and facilitate the diffusion of phase-out policies.7 Membership of the Alliance 
requires states to make (non-binding) public declarations that they will refrain from 
building new, unabated coal-fired power stations and will phase out existing ones. There is 
no institutional mechanism to enforce compliance, but this is not necessary: it is difficult to 
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build or operate a coal-fired power station covertly, so participants know they will be held 
to account by other states, civil society actors and their own citizens if they fail to comply.  
While this transparency may discourage faint-hearted politicians from signing up to fossil 
fuel bans in the first place, it also exposes them as free-riders if they don’t. Such exposure 
will render them more vulnerable to the kinds of domestic political pressures and 
international social costs discussed above. In this way, transparency, domestic political 
mobilisation, and international norm diffusion combine to make fossil fuel bans a potent 
instrument in the climate policy toolkit. 
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